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the judgment on a note to be a waiver of the tort,"' thus restricting the.
court to the judgment alone. Connecticut has recently overruled an
earlier decision upholding the minority view and allowed the creditor
to present evidence outside of either the judgment or the record in
order to determine the nature of the debt. In this instance the Court
argued that it is an accepted principle that one may go behind a note
and that a judgment does not alter the character of indebtedness, there-
fore evidence extraneous to the record should not be precluded; to do
so would be to defeat the intention of Congress."2 Wisconsin is in
accord with the weight of authority, 3 but incidental findings of tort
appearing in the record will not bar a discharge.14
ARTHUR H. SEIDEL
Federal Taxation-Ownership for Federal Income Tax Purposes and
for Federal Gift Tax Purposes Distinguished - Taxpayer created two ir-
revocable trusts, with others as trustees, consisting of a securities trad-
ing account to be managed and operated under his direction for the
benefit of his three children. Taxpayer reserved the right to use the
corpus for marginal trading. It was provided that he would make
good any losses which resulted from such trading out of his own
earnings, and such losses were to be made good to him out of the first
profits that accrued from future transactions. The litigation involved
taxpayer's gift tax liability as grantor of the trusts for the marginal
trading profits. Held: The marginal trading profits are not taxable
gifts as they accrued immediately and directly to the trusts. Taxpayer
had no economic interest in such profits, and any losses suffered would
have been suffered by the trusts. What taxpayer contributed were his
services which he could withhold at any time, but he could not with-
hold any of the profits accruing from the marginal trading. Taxpayer
can not give what he can not withhold. Commissioner v. Hogle, 165 F.
(2d) 352 (C.C.A. 10, 1947).
160 S. 1949, (1935); Bronx County Trust Co. v. Cassin, 170 Misc. 962, 10
N.Y.S.(2d) 986, (1939); Scott v. Corn, Tex. Civ. App., 19 S.W.(2d) 412,
(1929).
-1 Ford v. Blackshear Mfg. Co., 140 Ga. 670, 79 S.E. 576, (1913) ; Consolidated
Plan v. Bonitatibus, 130 Conn. 199, 33 A.(2d) 140, (1943).
12 Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. Golombosky, 133 Conn. 317, 51 A. (2d) 817,
(1946).
13 Shawno Finance Co. v. Haase, supra. "It is true that in determining whether
the liability of a judgment debtor is dischargeable in bankruptcy under Sec-
tion 17(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, the court will look behind the judgment
and consider the entire record, and the actual fact disclosed thereby as the
basis for adjudicating liability will govern.", Estate of Weil, 249 Wis. 385,
24 N.W. 662, (1946).
14 Klatt v. Helming, 248 Wis. 139, 21 N.W. (2d) 261, (1945).
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RECENT DECISIONS
In a prior case involving the same taxpayer and the same trusts,
the litigation concerned his income tax liability as grantor of the trusts.'
In that case the Court held that the money derived from dividends,
interest, and capital gains from the outright sale of corpus was not his
income, but, under the Clifford case,2 the profits derived from mar-
ginal trading were taxable to him as they flowed from the exercise of
his judgment and skill and were in substance his earnings. He could
trade or not trade for the benefit of the trust as he saw fit. Thus he
exercised practical control, the Court said, over that portion of profits
accruing from his personal efforts in trading on the margins.
The Court's conclusion in the instant case would be inescapable were
it not for the rationale of the Clifford decision and the regulations
thereunder3 which ignore common law concepts of ownership and
treat the grantor of an irrevocable trust as the tax owner of the trust
income under various conditions. The Commissioner takes the position
that if the trust grantor is considered the income tax owner of the
marginal trading profits under the Clifford doctrine, it must logically
follow that he is also the gift tax owner of the income. In other words
the Commissioner is attempting to extend the rationale of the Clifford
case into the gift tax field. Thus far the courts have adhered to the
common law concept of ownership in the domain of gift taxes, dis-
regarding the legal concepts advanced in the estate and income tax
fields. It is improbable that the Commissioner, who is constantly seek-
ing new sources of revenue, will relinquish his position without an
opinion of the Supreme Court on the question.
The key word of the gift tax statute is "transfer".4 In order to
sustain the tax there must be a transfer. A transfer of what? The
main case states that a property interest must pass which again is an
expression of the common law concept of ownership. In Burnet v.
Guggenheim5 the Supreme Court indicated that the essence of a tax
transfer is the passage of control rather than any technical changes in
title. It is axiomatic that "taxation is not so much concerned with the
refinements of title as it is with the actual command over the property
taxed." 6 The prior decisions upon which the court in the instant case re-
lied in refusing to integrate the income and estate tax concepts with the
gift tax are not persuasive. In Beck v. Commissioner where the grantor
created an irrevocable insurance trust, the Court held that the grantor
was the income tax owner of the amount used to pay the premiums
1 Hogle v. Commissioner, 132 F. (2d) 66 (C.C.A. 10th, 1942).2 Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 84 L.Ed. 788, 60 S.Ct. 554 (1940).
3 Reg. 111, Sec. 2922(a)-21.
4 I.R.C., Sec. 1000.
5 288 U.S. 280, 289, 77 L.Ed. 748, 53 S.Ct. 369 (1931).
6 Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 74 L.Ed. 916, 50 S.Ct. 336 (1930); Chase Na-
tional Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327, 73 L.Ed. 405, 49 S.Ct. 126 (1940).
7 129 F.(2d) 243 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1942).
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but that same amount did not constitute a gift. The Court took notice
of the problem of integration but indicated that it was contrary to the
intention of Congress. In Prouty v. Commissioner" it was said, "The
gift tax does not need to be so closely integrated with the income tax
that decisions like the Clifford case extending the application of sec-
tion 22(a) to the grantor of a trust must necessarily be read as hold-
ing that no gift tax was payable upon the creation of the trust." This
case upon which the Court in the instant case placed great reliance has
no bearing on the problem whether the trust earnings arising annuall3
constitute a taxable gift from the grantor. There is no doubt that the
grantor in the instant case made a taxable gift of the corpus. In Lock-
hard v. Commissioner where the issue was squarely presented, the
Court rejected the Commissioner's contention saying, "This suggested
mode of treatment may be appropriate and reasonable; the only trouble
with it is that it is not sanctioned by the statutory scheme." Why the
courts here refuse to do judicially what Congress has not done is not
clear. The concept of tax ownership and the transfer of ownership, for
the most part, has not been a legislative creation . The answer may be
that the courts will respond more readily in dealing with tax avoidance
problems than they will where the question is one of adding gratuitous-
ly to the Commissioner's sources of revenue.
RAY ECKSTEIN
Landlord-Tenant-Abandonment of Lease-Re-entry and Occupancy
by Landlord-Plaintiff leased a Northern Wisconsin cabin to the de-
fendant for a period of one year from July 15, 1947 at $37.00 per
month. Defendant paid two months rent in advance, and occupied the
premises on the agreed date. On September 15, 1947, defendant, with-
out just cause, quit the premises and thereafter ceased to pay rent.
The plaintiff, upon learning of the defendant's intention to quit the
premises, told him that she "would sue him", and two days after the
breach she brought this action, relying on the doctrine of the Wien-
sklar case.' Shortly after the abandonment, plaintiff entered and relet
the premises until October 23, 1947. Thereafter the plaintiff's husband
occupied the premises, the plaintiff joining him on weekends. The lower
court affirmed the jury award of $150.00 to the plaintiff. Held: Judg-
8115 F.(2d) 331 (C.C.A. 1st, 1940).
9 166 F.(2d) 409 (C.C.A. 1st, 1948).
1 Weinsklar Realty Co. v. Dooley et al., 200 Wis. 412 at 415, 228 N.W. 515
(1930), where the landlord relet the abandoned premises and brought an
action for breach of lease three months after the breach. The court held:
"that act [bringing the action] clearly evidenced an election on part of the
landlord to hold the tenant liable on the covenant of the lease and clearly
established the fact the landlord took possession for the purpose of reletting
the premises in order to mitigate damages he sustained through the tenant's
breach of lease."
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